coliseum-reconciliation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest and synthesize multiple external artifacts ('returns') from a working directory, creating a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.\n
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read
phase-3-dispatch-log.mdand the contents of all files found in thereturns/directory.\n - Capability inventory: The agent uses
Read,Write,Edit,Glob, andGreptools to manipulate the file system. While no network exfiltration is present, the agent could be manipulated into creating, modifying, or deleting files based on injected instructions.\n - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters used to separate the external return data from the agent's core reconciliation logic, increasing the likelihood that the LLM may follow instructions embedded within those returns.\n
- Sanitization: The skill performs no validation, filtering, or sanitization of the return content before it is extracted and composed into the final artifact.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In Step 6a, the skill explicitly directs the agent to execute the
wccommand-line utility (e.g.,wc -w) on local files to compute compression ratios. Whilewcis a standard and typically safe utility, this confirms the agent is expected to perform shell command execution as part of its workflow.
Audit Metadata