coliseum-reconciliation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from multiple "return" files produced by subagents and incorporates them into a final composed artifact.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
phase-3-dispatch-log.mdto identify return paths and then reads the content of all files located within thereturns/directory. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the ingested content. It uses standard markdown blockquotes for the "grain" but provides no protection for other merged sections.
- Capability inventory: The skill is restricted to
Read,Write,Edit,Glob, andGreptools. It lacks network access and general shell execution capabilities, which limits the potential impact of an injection. - Sanitization: Content from "BLOCKED" blocks and the subagent "claims" are intended to be included verbatim in the
phase-4-composed-whole.mdfile. This allows potentially malicious instructions or hidden payloads from a compromised subagent output to persist into the final artifact, potentially affecting downstream agents or users.
Audit Metadata