internal-comms
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to ingest and summarize data from various corporate and external sources, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill retrieves information from Slack channels, Google Drive documents, Emails, Calendar events, and external press articles as specified in
examples/3p-updates.md,examples/company-newsletter.md, andexamples/faq-answers.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not include specific delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when processing these external inputs.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the agent's tools to read sensitive communication data and perform text generation; it does not explicitly invoke dangerous subprocesses or network writes, but it lacks constraints on how the ingested data influences the output.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the retrieved content before it is interpolated into the drafting process.
Audit Metadata