AI Data Remediation Engineer
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates Python code strings using a local Small Language Model (SLM) and executes them using the
eval()function. - Evidence: The function
apply_fix_to_clusterinSKILL.mdcontains the linetransform_fn = eval(fix['transformation']). - Risk: While the skill attempts to sanitize the AI-generated string by checking for a subset of dangerous keywords (e.g.,
import,exec,os),eval()remains a high-risk capability that can be bypassed by sophisticated payloads or library-specific vulnerabilities. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data rows and passes samples of these rows into an AI model to generate executable code, creating a significant injection surface.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via the
suspect_rowsargument in thecluster_anomaliesandgenerate_fix_logicfunctions withinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The prompt construction for the SLM lacks strong delimiters or specialized instruction isolation between the system prompt and the user-supplied data samples.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute dynamic Python code via
eval(). - Sanitization: The skill relies on basic keyword filtering (
import,exec,eval,os.,subprocess) to validate the AI's output before execution, which is an incomplete defense against adversarial prompt injection. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The use of
eval()facilitates the execution of arbitrary Python expressions, which can be leveraged for broader system interaction depending on the environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill mentions the use of local models and libraries such as
phi3,Llama-3, andMistralvia Ollama, along withsentence-transformersandChromaDBfor embedding and clustering operations. These are documented as local dependencies for the data remediation workflow.
Audit Metadata