Voice AI Integration Engineer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
subprocess.runfunction to invokeffmpegandffprobefor audio validation and preprocessing. While the code follows best practices by using list-style arguments to prevent shell injection, it still performs direct system command execution. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads pre-trained speaker diarization models from Hugging Face (
pyannote/speaker-diarization-3.1) at runtime using thepyannote.audiolibrary. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted audio data, transcribes it, and then prepares a payload specifically designed for handoff to downstream LLM agents. This creates a risk where instructions spoken within the audio could influence the behavior of the subsequent agent.
- Ingestion points: Audio files are ingested and processed through the
validate_audio_fileandtranscribe_chunkfunctions inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill uses speaker labels and timestamps to structure the output, but it does not employ explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore commands embedded in the transcript text.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to perform network POST requests via
httpx.postand execute shell commands viasubprocess.runas defined inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: A
normalize_transcriptfunction is included to clean model artifacts (like capitalization or noise markers), but it does not perform sanitization for prompt injection patterns. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes a function
post_transcript_to_cmsthat sends transcribed content and associated metadata to external CMS endpoints viahttpx. While the endpoint and credentials are provided as parameters, this represents a standard network exfiltration path.
Audit Metadata