5dive-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
5diveCLI, often requiringsudoprivileges to manage systemd units, Linux users, and tmux sessions associated with background agents. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Commands such as
5dive crew installand5dive agent importfacilitate the downloading and execution of external code, including git-based projects and agent personas with associated hooks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates fetching external resources for agent provisioning and system updates, targeting vendor-specific repositories and user-specified URLs.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Provides built-in commands for transmitting data externally, specifically through
5dive pushfor GitHub integrations,5dive deployfor Vercel deployments, and a5dive bugcommand that transmits diagnostic telemetry to the vendor's repository. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection due to the ingestion of data from various sources.
- Ingestion points: Inter-agent messages via
agent ask/agent logs, shared task data intasks.db, and external inbound messages from Telegram or Discord channels. - Boundary markers: The CLI implements a messaging envelope (
[5dive-msg from=<name> id=<id>]) to help the agent distinguish between peer messages and instructions, though these do not prevent adversarial injection. - Capability inventory: The agent can execute administrative commands, write to shared databases, push/deploy code, and interact with other agents via
tmux send-keys. - Sanitization: The instructions recommend quoting message bodies to avoid shell interpolation, but there is no evidence of automated filtering or sanitization of ingested content before it enters the agent's context.
Audit Metadata