5dive-cli
Fail
Audited by Snyk on Nov 16, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis
CRITICAL E004: Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.
- Potential prompt injection detected (medium risk: 0.30). The skill documents a legitimate 5dive CLI with disclosed, purpose-aligned behavior, but its gate rules steer agents to route decisions away from the human owner (calling human gates "a decision you find uncomfortable" and forbidding re-filing to reach a person), which weakens the user's control beyond what the task needs.
MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
- Third-party content exposure detected (medium risk: 0.30). The required task-queue workflow (
5dive task ls/show, and the heartbeat that wakes seats with queued rows) reads task titles and bodies, and5dive trigger add github(--task-title) turns outsider-authored GitHub issue text into ordinary queue rows without the agent selecting a specific item, so this is a medium-risk path.
MEDIUM W009: Direct money access capability detected (payment gateways, crypto, banking).
- Direct money access detected (high risk: 0.70). The skill mainly covers agent orchestration, task queues and secret gates, which are not financial operations. It also documents a payment-credential route.
sudo 5dive secret link --cardstores a card's number, expiry, CVC and holder name. A5dive browser actstep then types them into a site using"saved":"<name>.number|.exp|.cvc|.holder". That lets the agent make purchases or charges through a browser, which is a direct financial operation. No service-enforced authentication or approval is documented on the agent's use of the saved card. The owner supplies the card through a one-time link, but the agent then references the card by name. The "low-limit virtual card" caution is a spending limit, and the money-gate tier floors depend on the agent filing atask needgate, so neither counts as independent access control. I judge it a direct operation with no qualifying control.
MEDIUM W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.
- Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (medium risk: 0.55). The skill tells the agent to run
sudo 5dive agent create, which by its own description creates a new Linux user (agent-<name>) and a systemd unit. It also covers writing/etc/5dive/connectors/tools.shand similar root-level state. This is a vendor CLI with a scoped sudo grant and a teardown step (agent rm), and the skill never asks for NOPASSWD:ALL or a security bypass, which lowers the severity.
Issues (4)
E004
CRITICALPrompt injection detected in skill instructions.
W011
MEDIUMThird-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
W009
MEDIUMDirect money access capability detected (payment gateways, crypto, banking).
W013
MEDIUMAttempt to modify system services in skill instructions.
Audit Metadata