openagent
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute commands using
sudoto import and provision new agent teammates (sudo 5dive agent import ...). This constitutes administrative privilege escalation for the purpose of managing system-level agent services. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on
npxto download and execute the@5dive/openagentpackage from the npm registry at runtime. While the package is provided by the skill's author, the use ofnpxfor dynamic execution of remote code is a notable security pattern. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
curlto fetch images frompollinations.ai, a third-party image generation service, to create persona avatars when a local generator is unavailable. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input (such as names, roles, and avatar descriptions) into a YAML configuration file. This file is subsequently consumed by CLI tools for rendering and provisioning. The skill includes a mitigation step by instructing the agent to validate the persona against a schema before processing to prevent malformed data or injection attempts.
- Ingestion points: SKILL.md (Gather your identity section for name, role, and avatar prompts).
- Boundary markers: The skill explicitly mentions that the file is checked against the v0.2 schema and malformed files are rejected before provisioning.
- Capability inventory: npx package execution, sudo command execution, curl network downloads, and file system writes (mkdir, cd).
- Sanitization: Schema validation is performed by the
validateandimportcommands.
Audit Metadata