cocoindex
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the creation of ETL pipelines that ingest untrusted content from sources like local files, Amazon S3, and Postgres databases (SKILL.md, flow-patterns.md). This content is processed using LLMs via functions like
ExtractByLlmor custom functions.\n - Ingestion points: Data is pulled from
LocalFile,AmazonS3, andPostgressources into the agent's processing context.\n - Boundary markers: There are no patterns or instructions provided for using boundary markers or delimiters to isolate untrusted content from LLM instructions.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill enables LLM text generation/extraction, network requests via the
requestslibrary, and writing to databases and vector indexes (custom-functions.md, api-operations.md).\n - Sanitization: The documentation does not specify sanitization or escaping mechanisms for input data prior to LLM processing.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation includes instructions for executing the
cocoindex update --setup -f maincommand, which utilizes the-fflag to force setup and updates, effectively skipping manual confirmation prompts (SKILL.md).\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill supports ingesting data from well-known external storage and cloud services including Amazon S3, Azure Blob Storage, and Google Drive, as well as interacting with third-party LLM provider APIs (SKILL.md).
Audit Metadata