context-management

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The memory-management.md file explicitly identifies 'API endpoints and credentials' as key information types to preserve within the knowledge graph using the mcp__memory__add_observations tool. Storing secrets in a shared memory graph increases the risk of exposure to other agents or sessions accessing the same memory space.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's architecture is centered on capturing and redistributing context across sessions and agents, which creates a significant surface for indirect prompt injection if the ingested data contains malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data is ingested from the knowledge graph through mcp__memory__search_nodes and mcp__memory__open_nodes, and from filesystem artifacts in .claude/ and /tmp/ directories as described in references/patterns.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks instructions for using delimiters or explicit boundary markers when re-injecting stored context into an agent's active prompt.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the local filesystem (session context files) and perform CRUD operations on the MCP memory server.
  • Sanitization: There is no mechanism described for sanitizing, escaping, or validating stored observations before they are used to influence agent behavior in subsequent sessions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 8, 2026, 12:05 AM