context-management
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The
memory-management.mdfile explicitly identifies 'API endpoints and credentials' as key information types to preserve within the knowledge graph using themcp__memory__add_observationstool. Storing secrets in a shared memory graph increases the risk of exposure to other agents or sessions accessing the same memory space. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's architecture is centered on capturing and redistributing context across sessions and agents, which creates a significant surface for indirect prompt injection if the ingested data contains malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data is ingested from the knowledge graph through
mcp__memory__search_nodesandmcp__memory__open_nodes, and from filesystem artifacts in.claude/and/tmp/directories as described inreferences/patterns.md. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks instructions for using delimiters or explicit boundary markers when re-injecting stored context into an agent's active prompt.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the local filesystem (session context files) and perform CRUD operations on the MCP memory server.
- Sanitization: There is no mechanism described for sanitizing, escaping, or validating stored observations before they are used to influence agent behavior in subsequent sessions.
Audit Metadata