file-organizer
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill's analysis phase involves commands that can expose sensitive file paths to the model context.
- Instructions in
SKILL.mdsuggest usingls -laon user-specified directories, which can include sensitive paths such as~/.ssh,~/.aws, and.envfiles. - While the skill does not contain logic to exfiltrate this data over a network, the exposure of these paths to the model represents a data exposure risk according to internal security standards.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses powerful shell commands to inspect and modify the local filesystem.
- It utilizes
mv,mkdir,find, andduto reorganize files and create directory structures. - It employs
md5hashing to identify duplicate files, which requires reading the contents of files within the target directories. - The skill includes safety instructions requiring the agent to seek explicit user confirmation before deleting duplicates or executing a proposed organization plan.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted metadata from the filesystem, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads directory contents, filenames, and file types using
lsandfindcommands inSKILL.md(Step 2 and 4). - Boundary markers: There are no specific delimiters or instructions to prevent the model from interpreting content within filenames as instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to move (
mv), rename, and delete (rm) files as specified inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: The instructions do not define any sanitization or validation processes for filenames or paths before they are processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata