n8n-development
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The documentation contains instructions to install the
n8n-cliutility by piping a script downloaded viacurldirectly into the shell (| sh). This is a dangerous execution pattern that allows for arbitrary code execution from a non-trusted repository. - Evidence: Found in
references/cli_commands.md:curl -sSLf https://raw.github.com/edenreich/n8n-cli/main/install.sh | sh. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill encourages downloading and installing software from untrusted third-party sources via several methods including direct shell scripts and package managers.
- Evidence: References to
github.com/edenreich/n8n-cliandedenreich/tap/n8n-clifor installation. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a framework for ingesting and processing n8n workflow JSON and YAML templates, which could be exploited if malicious instructions are embedded in these files.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to load and process files from
nathan/workflows/,workflow_registry.yaml, andtemplates/flows/. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no explicit instructions to treat the content of these external files as untrusted or to isolate their execution context.
- Capability inventory: The skill can trigger external webhooks, manage Docker containers, and execute local shell commands via
uv runanddocker compose. - Sanitization: While Pydantic is used for basic schema validation, there is no evidence of sanitization to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the workflow data or templates.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata