scaffold-skill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands (
npm run skills:create) using user-supplied parameters for the--nameand--projectflags. This presents a potential command injection surface if the agent fails to sanitize these inputs before they are passed to the shell. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The workflow directs the agent to locate, read, and follow the instructions of an external skill file (
create-skill/SKILL.md) found in directories like~/.cursoror~/.claude. This constitutes an indirect prompt injection surface as the agent is instructed to treat external content as authoritative for its current task. \n- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to search for and ingest content from external skill files at paths like~/.cursor/skills-cursor/create-skill/SKILL.md(File: SKILL.md). \n- Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions are provided for the ingested content. \n- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands vianpm runand perform file system operations. \n- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the external instructions before the agent begins following them.
Audit Metadata