assimilate-popular-workflows

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 9, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several GitHub CLI (gh) commands to search for code, find repositories by topic, and interact with the GitHub API for repository enrichment.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill clones external, unverified repositories from GitHub into a local temporary directory (.a5c/tmp/skill-discovery/) and fetches metadata from clawhub.ai to discover new workflows and plugins.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to "assimilate" logic from external sources by parsing SKILL.md files and generating executable CommonJS (.cjs) files in the .a5c/processes/assimilated/ directory. Although these scripts are staged for review before being "promoted" to the library, the automated generation of executable code from untrusted remote content represents a significant security risk.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes markdown and text from arbitrary public repositories, creating a substantial attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Data is ingested from gh search results and the content of files (such as SKILL.md and plugin.json) within cloned repositories.
  • Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or delimiters are used to isolate untrusted external content during processing.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands (gh), perform network operations (cloning, fetching), and write executable files to the local file system.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or strict validation of the external content before it is parsed for procedural insights or used in code generation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 9, 2026, 09:59 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — assimilate-popular-workflows