assimilate-popular-workflows
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several GitHub CLI (
gh) commands to search for code, find repositories by topic, and interact with the GitHub API for repository enrichment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill clones external, unverified repositories from GitHub into a local temporary directory (
.a5c/tmp/skill-discovery/) and fetches metadata fromclawhub.aito discover new workflows and plugins. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to "assimilate" logic from external sources by parsing
SKILL.mdfiles and generating executable CommonJS (.cjs) files in the.a5c/processes/assimilated/directory. Although these scripts are staged for review before being "promoted" to the library, the automated generation of executable code from untrusted remote content represents a significant security risk. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes markdown and text from arbitrary public repositories, creating a substantial attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested from
gh searchresults and the content of files (such asSKILL.mdandplugin.json) within cloned repositories. - Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or delimiters are used to isolate untrusted external content during processing.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands (
gh), perform network operations (cloning, fetching), and write executable files to the local file system. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or strict validation of the external content before it is parsed for procedural insights or used in code generation.
Audit Metadata