crm-automation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting untrusted data from external sources and using it within AI-driven workflows.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the system through webhook triggers (e.g.,
event: form_submissioninSKILL.md), CRM event triggers (hubspot_deal_updated), and integration triggers (calendly.booking_created,linkedin.connection_accepted). - Boundary markers: The templates lack explicit boundary markers or instructions to the AI to ignore instructions potentially embedded within the lead data or CRM records (e.g., in the
Compare these contactsprompt). - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes tools to create and update records in HubSpot, Salesforce, and Pipedrive, and has the capability to trigger email sequences and post to Slack notifications.
- Sanitization: No specific sanitization, validation, or escaping of external lead data is defined before it is interpolated into AI prompts for lead scoring or deduplication logic.
Audit Metadata