cross-team-comm

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs the agent to harvest sensitive information, including Gateway tokens, Feishu app IDs, and app secrets, by reading and searching the ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json configuration file.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides procedures for the agent to execute shell commands like cat, grep, find, and ls to collect metadata, configuration secrets, and agent identities from the file system.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill enables executing commands on remote instances through SSH, facilitating cross-instance management and data collection.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill describes methods to transmit collected data and credentials between instances using sessions_send or by directly calling external APIs (e.g., Feishu) with harvested secrets.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect injection as it processes data from remote agents and SSH outputs without defined boundaries or sanitization.
  • Ingestion points: Messages received via sessions_send and outputs from remote SSH sessions.
  • Boundary markers: None present to delimit untrusted remote data.
  • Capability inventory: SSH command execution, file system access (cat, find), and network operations (curl, requests).
  • Sanitization: No evidence of input validation or escaping for remote content.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Aug 16, 2026, 02:19 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — cross-team-comm