cross-team-comm
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs the agent to harvest sensitive information, including Gateway tokens, Feishu app IDs, and app secrets, by reading and searching the
~/.openclaw/openclaw.jsonconfiguration file. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides procedures for the agent to execute shell commands like
cat,grep,find, andlsto collect metadata, configuration secrets, and agent identities from the file system. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill enables executing commands on remote instances through SSH, facilitating cross-instance management and data collection.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill describes methods to transmit collected data and credentials between instances using
sessions_sendor by directly calling external APIs (e.g., Feishu) with harvested secrets. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect injection as it processes data from remote agents and SSH outputs without defined boundaries or sanitization.
- Ingestion points: Messages received via
sessions_sendand outputs from remote SSH sessions. - Boundary markers: None present to delimit untrusted remote data.
- Capability inventory: SSH command execution, file system access (
cat,find), and network operations (curl,requests). - Sanitization: No evidence of input validation or escaping for remote content.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata