ct-monitor
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources, including Twitter feeds (KOL tweets), news titles, and RSS feeds, which are ingested via the
api.ctmon.xyzAPI. This content is interpolated into the agent's context for synthesis and reporting. The lack of explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands creates a risk that malicious instructions within the fetched data could influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context through endpoints such as
/tweets/feed,/info/feed, and/twitter/realtimeas seen inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The prompt templates provided in the 'Combos' sections do not utilize clear delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from obeying instructions found within the data.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
curlandjqfor data processing, and provides instructions for usingopenclaw cronto automate tasks. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the remote content before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to execute shell commands using
curlandjqto interact with the vendor's API. While these are used for the intended purpose of the skill, they represent the execution of local binaries based on parameters defined in the instructions. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to fetch data from
https://api.ctmon.xyz/api. This is the primary functionality of the skill and targets the author's infrastructure, but it involves downloading and processing external content at runtime.
Audit Metadata