multimodal-gen
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
subprocess.runfunction across multiple files (generate.py,generate_image.py,generate_video.py,prompt_optimizer.py) to execute the system'spassutility and coordinate between local Python scripts. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The tool retrieves API credentials from the system's
passpassword manager (pass api/xingjiabiapi) and transmits them in the Authorization header to the external domainxingjiabiapi.com. While this is functional for the skill's purpose, it involves automated extraction and external transmission of system-stored secrets. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads content from external, non-whitelisted domains including
xingjiabiapi.comands3.ffire.ccto save images and videos locally. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input by interpolating it into prompts sent to LLM optimizers and generative models, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The user-provided prompt is ingested via
sys.argv[1]ingenerate.py. - Boundary markers: None are present to delimit user input from system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has network access (
requests), file system write access (open), and command execution capabilities (subprocess.run). - Sanitization: Relies on LLM-based instructions in
prompt_optimizer.pyto filter or rephrase content rather than deterministic sanitization methods.
Audit Metadata