provider-key-manager
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill's primary function involves reading, writing, and displaying API keys stored in
~/.openclaw/openclaw.jsonand variousmodels.jsonfiles within the agent workspaces. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
testandupdatecommands use theurlliblibrary to send plaintext API keys to external AI provider endpoints (such as OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google) to verify connectivity. While these are legitimate well-known services associated with the keys, this behavior represents a transit of sensitive data over the network. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script executes the system's
passutility usingsubprocess.runto insert and update credentials in the local password store. The path used for the password store is partially derived from user-supplied provider names. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external
models.jsonfiles located in agent directories. - Ingestion points: Reads
~/.openclaw/agents/*/agent/models.jsonincmd_audit,cmd_migrate, andcmd_updatefunctions. - Boundary markers: None; the script parses the JSON content and processes provider keys directly.
- Capability inventory: File system read/write via
json.load/json.dump, network requests viaurllib.request, and shell command execution viasubprocess.runfor thepassutility. - Sanitization: Minimal sanitization is performed on input keys; however, provider names are validated against a hardcoded map in some contexts.
Audit Metadata