qq-email-operator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/qq_email.pyinvokes thepasscommand-line utility to fetch email authorization codes. While it uses an argument list to avoid shell injection, this interaction with a local password manager introduces complexity that requires careful input handling.\n - Evidence: The function
get_auth_codeinscripts/qq_email.pyusessubprocess.run([\"pass\", \"show\", path], ...)to retrieve credentials.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: A path traversal vulnerability exists in the credential retrieval logic withinscripts/qq_email.py. The script constructs the path for thepassutility directly from the user-provided--accountargument without validation. This could allow an attacker to read unauthorized secrets from the user's password store by providing a path containing directory traversal sequences (e.g.,../../other_secret).\n - Evidence: The
pathvariable inget_auth_codeis formatted asf\"email/qq/{account}\"whereaccountis an unvalidated input parameter.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from external emails which could contain malicious instructions for the agent.\n - Ingestion points:
scripts/qq_email.pyfetches email headers and bodies through the IMAP protocol fromimap.qq.com.\n - Boundary markers: Absent. Email content is presented to the agent without delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore potentially malicious commands embedded in the text.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to send and reply to emails via SMTP (
smtplib.send_message), which could be abused if the agent follows instructions found within a processed email.\n - Sanitization: Absent. The script performs basic HTML-to-text conversion but does not sanitize content to prevent it from being interpreted as instructions by the language model.
Audit Metadata