wechat-toolkit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts
publish.jsandpublish_with_video.jsusechild_process.execFileSyncto invoke the external@wenyan-md/clitool (wenyan) to transform and upload Markdown content to WeChat. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The publishing scripts are designed to load sensitive API credentials (
WECHAT_APP_ID,WECHAT_APP_SECRET) from environment variables or by parsing specific local files in the user's home directory, such as~/.openclaw/workspace/TOOLS.md. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill communicates with official WeChat API endpoints (
api.weixin.qq.com) and Sogou search services (weixin.sogou.com) to search, download, and publish content. No unauthorized network destinations were identified. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface because it ingests untrusted data from the web which is then processed by the agent.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted article content and search results are ingested via
search_wechat.jsanddownload.js. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement explicit boundary markers or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the ingested content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the local file system and execute shell commands through the publisher scripts.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the web-sourced content before it is presented to the agent for rewriting or 'washing'.
Audit Metadata