wechat-toolkit

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 28, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts publish.js and publish_with_video.js use child_process.execFileSync to invoke the external @wenyan-md/cli tool (wenyan) to transform and upload Markdown content to WeChat.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The publishing scripts are designed to load sensitive API credentials (WECHAT_APP_ID, WECHAT_APP_SECRET) from environment variables or by parsing specific local files in the user's home directory, such as ~/.openclaw/workspace/TOOLS.md.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill communicates with official WeChat API endpoints (api.weixin.qq.com) and Sogou search services (weixin.sogou.com) to search, download, and publish content. No unauthorized network destinations were identified.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface because it ingests untrusted data from the web which is then processed by the agent.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted article content and search results are ingested via search_wechat.js and download.js.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not implement explicit boundary markers or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the ingested content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the local file system and execute shell commands through the publisher scripts.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the web-sourced content before it is presented to the agent for rewriting or 'washing'.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 28, 2026, 05:35 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — wechat-toolkit