agent-task-confirm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a task monitoring workflow that reads the content of messages from other agents via
sessions_listto determine state transitions. This creates an indirect prompt injection surface where a monitored agent could influence the supervising agent's actions. - Ingestion points: The
sessions_listtool is called in 'Step 2' and 'Batch Check' inSKILL.mdto retrieve session status and message content. - Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not specify delimiters or provide warnings to the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the monitored messages.
- Capability inventory: The
sessions_sendtool is used across multiple steps to dispatch new commands, status updates, and prompts based on the ingested data. - Sanitization: Absent; there is no logic described for validating or filtering the message content retrieved from sessions before it is used to trigger subsequent logic.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructions contain a hardcoded Telegram group identifier (
-1003890797239) within thesessionKeyparameter. This exposes specific internal infrastructure details in the skill's logic.
Audit Metadata