virtual-singer-mv-script
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFE
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: Several example files (e.g.,
examples/sakura_mv_final.json,examples/yutin_mv_final.json, andexamples/sakura_mv_final.md) contain hardcoded absolute file paths pointing to a specific user's home directory (e.g.,/home/aa/.openclaw/...). While not a critical vulnerability, this practice reveals information about the author's local directory structure and environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external input (lyrics and audio) to dynamically generate visual prompts for third-party AI video and image models via
scene-assigner.pyandmodel-selector.py. This represents a potential indirect prompt injection surface where carefully crafted lyrics could attempt to influence the behavior of downstream generative models. - Ingestion points: Lyrics text and audio file metadata are ingested via
scripts/lyrics-parser.pyandscripts/audio-analyzer.py. - Boundary markers: The skill does not employ explicit boundary markers or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the lyrics.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses local Python scripts to perform file operations and generate prompt strings; it does not directly execute remote commands but recommends model providers (e.g., Kling, Sora).
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering for the lyric content before it is interpolated into the
visual_promptfields.
Audit Metadata