agentmailer-mcp
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates an attack surface by ingesting and processing data from external sources during its troubleshooting and functional check workflows.
- Ingestion points: The agent processes output from the
auth_meandlist_inboxestools, as well as the content of a remote machine-readable guide located athttps://api.agentmailer.ai/auth.md(referenced in troubleshooting.md). - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no specific instructions for the agent to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions when processing these external data sources.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell command execution via the
claude mcp addandcodex mcp addcommands for environment configuration. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, validation, or filtering mechanisms are defined for the data retrieved from the remote MCP server or the auth guide.
Audit Metadata