author-sikaru-agent
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
sikarucommand-line interface (CLI) to manage the entire lifecycle of an agent. - Evidence includes the use of
sikaru agent validate,sikaru agent create,sikaru agent pull,sikaru agent push,sikaru agent publish, andsikaru agent runfor executing tasks. - The skill specifically mentions local tool execution via
sikaru agent run --compute local, which allows tools to run in the user's workspace with their OS permissions. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs the agent to fetch documentation and schema definitions from external sources to guide the authoring process.
- Evidence: The skill instructs the agent to read guidance from
https://sikaru.ai/agent-guide.mdand reference the agent document schema athttps://sikaru.ai/schemas/agent-document.json. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill authors agents that process workspace data and user instructions, creating a surface for potential indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The agents process user tasks, workspace files (such as CSVs mentioned in the template), and the content of the
agent.mddocument itself. - Boundary markers: The documentation encourages the use of structured YAML frontmatter and specific Markdown sections to organize agent logic and settings.
- Capability inventory: The authored agents have access to the
sikaruCLI, which can execute tools locally in the workspace or in a hosted environment, potentially including shell access and network requests. - Sanitization: There are no explicit instructions or mechanisms provided within the skill for sanitizing or escaping external data before it is processed by the authored agents.
Audit Metadata