brief-generator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied campaign details, product descriptions, and external 'Narrative canon' data to generate structured influencer briefs. This ingestion of untrusted or external data creates a surface where malicious instructions could potentially influence the agent's output.
- Ingestion points: User inputs (campaign, product, platform, deliverables) and local projection files (e.g.,
memory/projections/narrative.json,memory/projections/claims.json). - Boundary markers: The skill uses a
dependency_statusfield (verified | approved-fallback | blocked) and markers like[needs source]to track the provenance and validity of claims, which provides some mitigation against accidental obedience. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write files to the local file system (
memory/influencer/brief-generator/) and execute theregistry-events.pyscript. - Sanitization: There is no explicit description of sanitizing or escaping the input data before it is interpolated into the brief templates provided in
references/brief-templates.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions specify that unresolved wording should be submitted through
registry-events.pyas an authorizedoperation: proposeevent. This involves the execution of a local script to handle data state changes or proposals within the marketing workflow.
Audit Metadata