consent-registry
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands using user-provided input, specifically
python3 "$AARON_SKILLS_ROOT/scripts/registry-events.py" is-suppressed <subject-id>. The<subject-id>variable is derived from external input, creating a potential command injection vector if the agent does not perform strict sanitization of shell metacharacters. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic path resolution to locate its internal scripts, instructing the agent to resolve
AARON_SKILLS_ROOTusing environment variables orgit rev-parse --show-toplevel. This path is then used to execute a Python script (registry-events.py) at runtime. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted subscriber data which serves as an attack surface for indirect injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests
subject-idand event-based data from the user's environment or system logs to perform lookups and record consent facts. - Boundary markers: The instructions specify that the system NFKC-normalizes strings and requires typed fields, providing some structural boundaries, but lacks explicit prompt delimiters for the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes subprocess execution via
python3to read/write to theconsent.ndjsonstream. - Sanitization: While the skill documentation claims to normalize strings and enforce pseudonymity, it does not explicitly instruct the agent to escape the
subject-idbefore interpolating it into the shell command template.
Audit Metadata