influencer-discovery
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external sources such as social media bios, video titles, and profile metadata which could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through the YouTube API script and oEmbed URLs for platforms like TikTok and X.
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters to isolate external content from the prompt templates.
- Capability inventory: The skill maintains permissions to write to the local file system (under the memory directory) and execute local scripts.
- Sanitization: No specific sanitization or escaping of the ingested social media content is described.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to invoke local Python scripts with parameters provided by the user or sourced externally.
- Evidence: The skill executes
python3 "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/connectors/youtube.py" channel @handle. - Risk: Influencer handles are passed directly as arguments to shell commands; if a handle contains shell metacharacters, it could lead to command injection within the local execution environment.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches metadata from well-known social media services.
- Evidence: The skill makes requests to
youtube.com,tiktok.com, andtwitter.comto retrieve oEmbed and API data.
Audit Metadata