influencer-discovery

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external sources such as social media bios, video titles, and profile metadata which could contain malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through the YouTube API script and oEmbed URLs for platforms like TikTok and X.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters to isolate external content from the prompt templates.
  • Capability inventory: The skill maintains permissions to write to the local file system (under the memory directory) and execute local scripts.
  • Sanitization: No specific sanitization or escaping of the ingested social media content is described.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to invoke local Python scripts with parameters provided by the user or sourced externally.
  • Evidence: The skill executes python3 "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/connectors/youtube.py" channel @handle.
  • Risk: Influencer handles are passed directly as arguments to shell commands; if a handle contains shell metacharacters, it could lead to command injection within the local execution environment.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches metadata from well-known social media services.
  • Evidence: The skill makes requests to youtube.com, tiktok.com, and twitter.com to retrieve oEmbed and API data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 2, 2026, 11:37 PM