narrative-enablement-kit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes potentially untrusted external content, such as bio drafts and spokesperson answers, which serves as an ingestion point for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: User-provided bio drafts, spokesperson answers, and pasted canon excerpts.
- Boundary markers: The instructions explicitly state to treat these inputs as untrusted and to ignore any instructions embedded within them.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write to the
memory/directory and execute the local scriptregistry-events.pyto propose new data entries. - Sanitization: The skill includes a step to sweep output against a banned-vocabulary list defined in the skill contract.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is configured to execute a local script named
registry-events.pyto handle authorized data proposals to the narrative registry. This is a functional requirement for maintaining the agent's memory systems and is limited to internal operations.
Audit Metadata