outreach-manager
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied influencer data and campaign context, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Influencer handles, niche descriptions, and deliverables provided by the user, as well as roster records retrieved from
memory/creators/<handle-slug>.md(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The skill utilizes structured templates in
references/templates.mdand mandatory 'cold-copy rules' inreferences/cold-copy-rules.mdto constrain agent output, though it lacks explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands within the input data. - Capability inventory: Capability to write to the local
memory/directory and execute theregistry-events.pyscript for registry updates (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: Content is reviewed through an 'expert-panel' persona method, but no formal programmatic sanitization or escaping of ingested data is described.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to invoke a local script named
registry-events.pyusing anoperation: proposerequest to update registry events. This interaction is restricted to internal state management and does not facilitate the execution of arbitrary shell commands or untrusted code. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill manages potentially sensitive creator data, including historical rates and contact paths, strictly within the local file system (
memory/directory). All network-related data sources are represented by~~placeholders, ensuring that no data is transmitted to external servers without explicit user configuration of connectors.
Audit Metadata