participation-warmup-planner

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from external community sources to determine graduation criteria and account standing.
  • Ingestion points: The skill processes pasted rule pages, moderator statements, DM screenshots, and analytics exports to build its plans.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters (e.g., XML tags or special tokens) to isolate untrusted data from the instruction stream, though it does include a high-level security warning.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute local scripts (registry-events.py) to propose state changes and write plan documents to the local memory/ directory.
  • Sanitization: There is no technical sanitization or escaping of the ingested data; the skill relies entirely on the agent's ability to follow a meta-instruction to ignore potential overrides.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's operational logic involves calling local Python scripts located in the scripts/connectors/ directory (including discourse.py, hn.py, bluesky.py, and fediverse.py) to retrieve account and community data. It also invokes registry-events.py for proposing updates to the internal channel registry.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill retrieves data from several well-known external community platforms and APIs, including Hacker News (via Algolia/Firebase APIs), Discourse forums, Bluesky, and the Fediverse. These operations are performed using keyless, public-read methods to gather account history and community rules.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 2, 2026, 11:36 PM