participation-warmup-planner
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from external community sources to determine graduation criteria and account standing.
- Ingestion points: The skill processes pasted rule pages, moderator statements, DM screenshots, and analytics exports to build its plans.
- Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters (e.g., XML tags or special tokens) to isolate untrusted data from the instruction stream, though it does include a high-level security warning.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute local scripts (
registry-events.py) to propose state changes and write plan documents to the localmemory/directory. - Sanitization: There is no technical sanitization or escaping of the ingested data; the skill relies entirely on the agent's ability to follow a meta-instruction to ignore potential overrides.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's operational logic involves calling local Python scripts located in the
scripts/connectors/directory (includingdiscourse.py,hn.py,bluesky.py, andfediverse.py) to retrieve account and community data. It also invokesregistry-events.pyfor proposing updates to the internal channel registry. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill retrieves data from several well-known external community platforms and APIs, including Hacker News (via Algolia/Firebase APIs), Discourse forums, Bluesky, and the Fediverse. These operations are performed using keyless, public-read methods to gather account history and community rules.
Audit Metadata