positioning-truth-tracer

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 20, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from scraped competitor web pages and user-pasted positioning canvases.
  • Ingestion points: External data is ingested through scripts/connectors/firecrawl.py (scraping) and scripts/connectors/tavily.py (searching), as well as user-supplied text.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions explicitly command the agent to treat these sources as untrusted input and to ignore any embedded instructions (referencing SECURITY.md).
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to perform network searches, read local memory files, and write to event logs via registry-events.py.
  • Sanitization: The skill relies on natural language instructions to the agent to prevent execution of embedded commands within the ingested data.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill initiates network requests to external services for competitive research.
  • Evidence: It utilizes scripts/connectors/tavily.py and scripts/connectors/firecrawl.py to fetch information from external domains. These are well-known search and scraping services used for standard data retrieval and do not involve the exfiltration of sensitive local credentials or system files.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interacts with the local file system and internal event buses using specific scripts.
  • Evidence: It executes registry-events.py with an operation: propose argument to update event logs (memory/events/*.ndjson). These operations are scoped to the skill's marketing workflow and do not include arbitrary shell command execution or privilege escalation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 20, 2026, 07:29 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — positioning-truth-tracer