positioning-truth-tracer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from scraped competitor web pages and user-pasted positioning canvases.
- Ingestion points: External data is ingested through
scripts/connectors/firecrawl.py(scraping) andscripts/connectors/tavily.py(searching), as well as user-supplied text. - Boundary markers: The instructions explicitly command the agent to treat these sources as untrusted input and to ignore any embedded instructions (referencing
SECURITY.md). - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to perform network searches, read local memory files, and write to event logs via
registry-events.py. - Sanitization: The skill relies on natural language instructions to the agent to prevent execution of embedded commands within the ingested data.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill initiates network requests to external services for competitive research.
- Evidence: It utilizes
scripts/connectors/tavily.pyandscripts/connectors/firecrawl.pyto fetch information from external domains. These are well-known search and scraping services used for standard data retrieval and do not involve the exfiltration of sensitive local credentials or system files. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interacts with the local file system and internal event buses using specific scripts.
- Evidence: It executes
registry-events.pywith anoperation: proposeargument to update event logs (memory/events/*.ndjson). These operations are scoped to the skill's marketing workflow and do not include arbitrary shell command execution or privilege escalation.
Audit Metadata