serp-analysis
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to execute specific Python scripts located within the plugin's root directory to interface with search APIs.
- Evidence: Templates in
SKILL.mdsuch aspython3 "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/connectors/firecrawl.py" search "<keyword>". - Context: The command execution is localized to the plugin's own connector scripts and follows standard patterns for agent-tool interactions.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the web (via the
WebFetchtool), which presents an indirect prompt injection surface. - Ingestion points: The content of top-ranking URLs fetched during analysis as described in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill includes a 'Security boundary' section in
SKILL.mdthat explicitly instructs the agent to treat fetched content as evidence only and to ignore any prompt-like directives or owner overrides within that data. - Capability inventory: The agent can execute local connector scripts and write analysis data to
memory/research/. - Sanitization: Relies on explicit instruction-following boundaries to separate untrusted data from the agent's command context.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill interacts with external services to fulfill its SEO analysis functions.
- Evidence: Utilizes Firecrawl and Tavily for live search results.
- Context: These are well-known, established search and SEO tools, and their use is consistent with the skill's stated purpose.
Audit Metadata