The Agent Skills Directory

[COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The Python script scripts/gdrive_to_repo_sync.py is vulnerable to shell command injection. The gdrive_folder_id and commit_message parameters are directly interpolated into shell command strings without sanitization.
Evidence: In scripts/gdrive_to_repo_sync.py, the run_command function uses subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True).
Evidence: Line 44: f"rclone copy manus_google_drive:{gdrive_folder_id} {temp_dir} ..." allows injection via the folder ID.
Evidence: Line 86: f'git commit -m "{commit_message}"' allows injection via the commit message.
[CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill and the synchronization script reference a hardcoded path to an rclone configuration file at /home/ubuntu/.gdrive-rclone.ini. This file typically contains sensitive authentication tokens and API keys for Google Drive access.
[COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The synchronization workflow relies on executing shell commands with shell=True for all git and rclone operations, which is a dangerous practice when handling variable input, significantly increasing the attack surface for local command execution.

autonomous-github-sync