autonomous-sync-script
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 27, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/gdrive_to_repo_sync.pyis vulnerable to shell command injection. It usessubprocess.run(shell=True)and interpolates command-line arguments directly into shell command strings without proper escaping. Specifically, in thecommit_and_pushfunction, thecommit_messageargument is interpolated into a git command:run_command(f"git commit -m '{commit_message}'", cwd=repo_path). A malicious commit message containing a single quote could terminate the argument and execute additional shell commands. Thegdrive_folderargument is also interpolated into the rclone command:cmd = f"rclone copy manus_google_drive:{gdrive_folder} {temp_dir}", posing a similar risk. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an automated pipeline for transferring files from an untrusted sandbox environment to a local machine and then to a GitHub repository. Ingestion points: Files are read from the Manus sandbox via Google Drive. Boundary markers: None provided; the skill does not instruct the user to review files before the local script commits them. Capability inventory: The script performs file system writes and git push operations. Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of file content or names is performed, allowing malicious content to be automatically committed to a repository.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The script initiates downloads from Google Drive using
rclone. While the remote is user-configured, the folder to download is determined by the agent's output.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata