autonomous-sync-script

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 27, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/gdrive_to_repo_sync.py is vulnerable to shell command injection. It uses subprocess.run(shell=True) and interpolates command-line arguments directly into shell command strings without proper escaping. Specifically, in the commit_and_push function, the commit_message argument is interpolated into a git command: run_command(f"git commit -m '{commit_message}'", cwd=repo_path). A malicious commit message containing a single quote could terminate the argument and execute additional shell commands. The gdrive_folder argument is also interpolated into the rclone command: cmd = f"rclone copy manus_google_drive:{gdrive_folder} {temp_dir}", posing a similar risk.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an automated pipeline for transferring files from an untrusted sandbox environment to a local machine and then to a GitHub repository. Ingestion points: Files are read from the Manus sandbox via Google Drive. Boundary markers: None provided; the skill does not instruct the user to review files before the local script commits them. Capability inventory: The script performs file system writes and git push operations. Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of file content or names is performed, allowing malicious content to be automatically committed to a repository.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The script initiates downloads from Google Drive using rclone. While the remote is user-configured, the folder to download is determined by the agent's output.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jun 27, 2026, 02:54 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — autonomous-sync-script