xlsx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pycontains logic to dynamically generate C source code, compile it into a shared object (.so) usinggcc, and then inject it into thesofficeprocess using theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable. This is intended to shim AF_UNIX socket calls in restricted environments. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts execute arbitrary system commands via
subprocess.run(): scripts/office/soffice.pycallsgccto compile the socket shim.scripts/recalc.pycallssoffice(LibreOffice) andgtimeout.scripts/office/validators/redlining.pycallsgit diffto compare document versions.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents a significant indirect prompt injection surface as it is designed to ingest and process untrusted spreadsheet and Office XML data from the user's environment.
- Ingestion points: Spreadsheet files read via
pandas.read_excel()andopenpyxl.load_workbook()inSKILL.mdand validator scripts. - Boundary markers: None detected in the provided code snippets to distinguish between data and instructions within the spreadsheet content.
- Capability inventory: Includes file system writes, execution of subprocesses (soffice, git, gcc), and macro management.
- Sanitization: Relies on third-party libraries like
pandasandopenpyxlfor parsing, but does not implement explicit content filtering for instructions embedded in cell data. - [PERSISTENCE_MECHANISMS]: The script
scripts/recalc.pyautomatically modifies the user's LibreOffice configuration by writing a macro file (Module1.xba) to~/.config/libreoffice/(Linux) or~/Library/Application Support/LibreOffice/(macOS). while functional, this modifies application behavior across sessions.
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