vercel-composition-patterns
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEMETADATA_POISONINGINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill metadata contains deceptive attribution. While the skill is authored by 'abhinavshrivastava950', the YAML frontmatter in
SKILL.mdexplicitly lists 'vercel' as the author. Although the body ofSKILL.mdmentions the content is 'vendored from Vercel', the author field in the metadata is misleading. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdfrontmatter containsmetadata: author: vercel. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to ingest and refactor external React codebases, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in a project's source code could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: External React codebase (specified as the target for refactoring tasks in
SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not provide delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the processed code.
- Capability inventory: The skill is intended for use in tasks involving component refactoring, which typically requires file-system write access and potentially execution of build/test tools.
- Sanitization: Absent. No guidelines are provided for escaping or validating the content of the components being refactored.
Audit Metadata