canvas-design
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-provided inputs to generate design philosophies and visual artifacts, creating a potential vector for indirect injection.
- Ingestion points: User-provided foundations and subtle inputs mentioned in
SKILL.md. - Capability inventory: The agent is instructed to create and output
.md,.pdf, and.pngfiles. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within user-provided concepts.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is defined for the incoming user data.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions utilize forceful language and behavioral overrides to ensure the agent adheres to a specific artistic persona and quality standard.
- Evidence: Multiple uses of
CRITICAL,IMPORTANT, andnon-negotiableto dictate specific design behaviors and output constraints. - Evidence: Explicit instructions to simulate 'human-crafted quality (not AI-generated)' and mimic a 'master-level execution,' which directs the agent to mask its AI nature in its output.
- Evidence: The 'FINAL STEP' section uses a pre-empted user statement ('The user ALREADY said...') to force the agent into a specific refinement logic, regardless of the actual user session state.
Audit Metadata