pptx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The module
scripts/office/soffice.pyimplements a sophisticated runtime execution pattern. It contains a C source code string (_SHIM_SOURCE) that is written to a temporary file and compiled into a shared object (.so) usinggccduring execution. This compiled library is then injected into the LibreOffice process using theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable. While this is used to work around socket restrictions in sandboxed environments, runtime compilation and process injection are high-risk patterns. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several components of the skill execute external binaries via the
subprocessmodule: scripts/office/soffice.pycallsgccto compile the socket shim.scripts/thumbnail.pyandscripts/office/soffice.pyexecutesoffice(LibreOffice) for file conversion.scripts/thumbnail.pyexecutespdftoppmto generate slide images.scripts/office/validators/redlining.pyexecutesgit difffor comparing document versions.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents an attack surface for indirect injection as it processes untrusted Office documents.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through file extraction in
scripts/add_slide.pyand text extraction viamarkitdownas described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Scripts do not implement explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the processed slides.
- Capability inventory: The skill has broad capabilities including arbitrary file system reads/writes (via zip manipulation and XML editing) and multiple subprocess execution paths.
- Sanitization: The skill mitigates XML-based attacks like XXE by using
defusedxmlfor parsing andlxmlwith default security settings.
Audit Metadata