product-launch-motion
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to visit and process content from external website URLs provided by the user to 'read your site' and 'write the story'. This creates a surface where a malicious website could attempt to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted content is ingested from website URLs passed as the primary input for the video generation process (e.g., in
README.mdandSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded prompts in the scraped website content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to powerful tools including
playwrightfor browser automation,ffmpegfor video manipulation, and the ability to executenodeandpythonscripts. It is also instructed to use theservetool to share the resulting media files. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering of external content is mentioned before it is processed by the LLM to generate the video brief.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on and instructs the agent to use various CLI tools and local scripts for video assembly, sound synthesis, and mastering.
- Evidence: The
legacy/scriptsfolder contains several.mjsand.shfiles used to wrapffmpeg,ffprobe, andnodeoperations.SKILL.mdalso specifies the use ofplaywrightandpython3for beat analysis. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill instructs the agent to access sensitive local data to enhance the authenticity of the product videos.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains a 'Non-negotiable' rule to 'Use real data', specifically prompting the agent to 'Pull real, defensible numbers read-only (creators reached, gifts sent, posts/views tracked)' from the user's database to display on rolling odometers in the video.
Audit Metadata