cross-model-peer-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runto execute a localgit check-ignorecommand within thepeer_profilestool. This is a security feature designed to warn users if their configuration files containing API keys are accidentally being tracked by version control. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
peer_asktool facilitates network requests to external OpenAI-compatible API endpoints usingurllib.request. This behavior is the core purpose of the skill, enabling cross-model deliberation. The implementation includes an "Egress Consent" mechanism (Requirement R5) to ensure the operator approves all outgoing transmissions. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill manages sensitive API keys through environment variables or local configuration files located in the user's home directory (
~/.peer-review/profiles.json). The code includes explicit redaction logic to prevent keys from leaking into error logs and ensures thepeer_profilestool does not return secret values to the agent. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data (artifacts and specs) by embedding them into a "packet" for analysis by another model.
- Ingestion points: The
peer_asktool reads a payload file from the.peer-review/directory containing the artifact to be reviewed. - Boundary markers: The skill uses structured Markdown headers and specific system prompts defined in
round-prompts.mdto guide the challenger model. - Capability inventory: The server has the capability to perform network requests and local git status checks.
- Sanitization: The skill intentionally avoids sanitizing the artifact content to maintain "transmission fidelity" (Requirement R15), relying instead on protocol-level separation and model guardrails to manage injection risks.
Audit Metadata