custom-plugin-refresh
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function involves ingesting data from external web searches and using it to influence agent actions and codebase modifications.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through the
research:deep-researchertool, which generates a "researcher report" from primary and recency sources on the web (SKILL.md, Step 1). - Boundary markers: The protocol does not specify the use of delimiters or sanitization steps when processing the research report during the diffing and editing stages (SKILL.md, Step 2).
- Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to perform surgical edits (
Edit), orchestrate other agents ("Spawn Explore agents"), and perform version control operations (commit) based on the external findings. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, escaping, or verification logic is provided to handle potentially malicious instructions embedded in web-based research reports.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for executing local scripts and shell pipelines to maintain plugin integrity and triage stale content.
- Evidence: The protocol references running a local script
python scripts/lint_bundled_paths.pyto enforce path naming policies (SKILL.md, Version-sensitive content). - Evidence: The "Triage on demand" section provides a shell pipeline using
git log,grep,awk, andsortto generate a list of overdue plugins, writing output to/tmp/recently-touched.txt.
Audit Metadata