grabber-development
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses imperative language designed to override other instructions and influence the agent's task prioritization, specifically stating: "This section overrides everything else in this skill if there is any conflict. Read it first, act on it first."
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instructions direct the user and the agent to install an external plugin from an untrusted source via the command:
claude plugin marketplace add lackeyjb/playwright-skill. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by capturing and reasoning from raw network traffic (XHR, fetch, WebSocket, SSE) from untrusted external websites.
- Ingestion points: Network traffic captured via
page.on("request"),page.on("response"), andpage.on("websocket")as described in the Discovery Gate section ofSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not define delimiters or provide instructions to ignore malicious content embedded in the captured data.
- Capability inventory: Access to the
playwright-skillplugin, inlineBashscript execution, and Python scripts (instagram_grab.py) capable of file system access and network operations. - Sanitization: Absent. The agent is explicitly encouraged to "reason from real endpoints" using the raw, unvalidated capture data, which may contain attacker-controlled strings.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes
page.evaluateinscripts/instagram_grab.pyto execute dynamically constructed JavaScript within the browser context and recommends generating and running inline automation scripts viaBash. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands for plugin management and browser automation tasks.
Audit Metadata