brand-persona-skill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external and potentially untrusted brand content (e.g., website copy, PDF guidelines, chat exports) in Phase 1A to distill a brand persona. This creates a surface for indirect instructions to be embedded in the source data.
- Ingestion points: External brand documents, chat exports, and social media archives provided during Phase 1A (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: The skill does not define explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested brand content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash,Write,Read, andWebSearchtools (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the content extracted from external documents before it is used in the distillation process.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs shell command execution to manage the persona generation lifecycle and network registration.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdPhase 4a executesnpx openpersona create --config persona.json --output ./{slug}-skillto generate the final persona pack. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdPhase 5 executesnpx openpersona acn-register {slug} --endpoint <url>to register the agent on the Agent Communication Network. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the installation and runtime execution of external code from public registries.
- Evidence: The skill facilitates the installation and execution of the
openpersonapackage vianpxornpm install(README.md).
Audit Metadata