persona-knowledge
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/ingest.pyusesimportlib.import_moduleto dynamically load adapter modules from theadapters/sub-package. The specific module to load is determined at runtime based on the--adapterargument or automatic detection of the source file type. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest and process large volumes of untrusted data (chat exports, notes, social media) to build a persona wiki, which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters via
scripts/ingest.pyand is stored in MemPalace (SQLite/ChromaDB). - Boundary markers: The instructions in
SKILL.mdfor the wiki building phase lack specific guidance on using delimiters or ignoring embedded instructions when the agent reads from the stored memories. - Capability inventory: The agent possesses
WriteandBashcapabilities, which could be misdirected by instructions hidden within the ingested chat or note content. - Sanitization: While a PII scanner exists to flag sensitive information, there is no content sanitization to strip or neutralize potential prompt injection attacks before the agent processes the data.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes developer-focused scripts such as
publish.shandtests/test_scripts.pythat execute shell commands and subprocesses to package the skill or run its internal scripts. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The
chat_exportadapter specifically targets the macOS iMessage database at~/Library/Messages/chat.db. Accessing this file involves reading highly sensitive personal communications. Additionally, the PII scanner inscripts/ingest.pyis configured to detect and flag hardcoded passwords (password,passwd,pwd) within the processed datasets.
Audit Metadata