postmark-inbound
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: A code example for processing email attachments contains a path traversal vulnerability.
- Evidence: In
references/handler-examples.md, theprocessAttachmentsfunction constructs a file path usingpath.join('/tmp/attachments', attachment.Name)and writes to it usingfs.writeFileSync. - Risk: Because
attachment.Nameis derived directly from the untrusted webhook payload without sanitization, a malicious sender could provide a filename containing directory traversal sequences (e.g.,../../etc/shadow) to attempt to overwrite or create files in unauthorized directories. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from emails, which are untrusted external sources, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill parses fields such as
From,Subject,TextBody,HtmlBody, andStrippedTextReplyfrom the JSON payload delivered to the webhook endpoint, as described inSKILL.mdandreferences/payload-structure.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions and example handlers do not implement delimiters or safety instructions to prevent the agent or application from interpreting malicious commands embedded within the email text.
- Capability inventory: The skill includes capabilities for file system writes (
fs.writeFileSync), console logging, and network operations through the Postmark API (e.g.,client.sendEmail,client.getInboundMessages). - Sanitization: The provided examples lack logic for sanitizing or validating email content or attachment metadata before it is processed or stored.
Audit Metadata