hivemind-memory
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads raw session logs and AI-generated summaries from
~/.deeplake/memory/and~/.claude/, which may contain sensitive user data. It includes ahivemind skillify pushcommand to upload local code (skills) to a remote organizational table. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
hivemind skillify pullcommand downloads scripts from a remote organizational source and installs them into the agent's skill directory (~/.claude/skills) for execution. Additionally, it executes a dynamically provided path usingnode "<AUTH_CMD>", which could lead to arbitrary code execution if the path context is manipulated. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]:
hivemind embeddings installdownloads approximately 600MB of dependencies and symlinks agent components. Theskillify pullcommand fetches remote skill definitions from an external source. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes
node, thehivemindCLI, and various bash utilities (grep,jq,sed,awk) to manage the filesystem, process memory data, and configure the environment. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill interacts with
~/.deeplake/config.jsonand handles SSO authentication and organization/member management tasks through thenode "<AUTH_CMD>"interface. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection by ingesting and acting upon historical session data and summaries that could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Reads files from
~/.deeplake/memory/and~/.claude/. - Boundary markers: None; the agent is instructed to "ALWAYS check" these sources without explicit delimiters or safety instructions.
- Capability inventory:
Bash,Grep,Read,hivemindCLI,node. - Sanitization: None; raw session data and markdown summaries are processed directly without validation.
Audit Metadata