doc-coauthoring
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection as it is designed to ingest and process data from external, potentially untrusted sources such as Slack messages, Teams threads, and shared cloud documents.
- Ingestion points: External content is retrieved via messaging/document integrations and user-provided links or file paths as described in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit requirements for using delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when the agent processes these external context streams.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
create_fileandstr_replacefor document management and invokes sub-agents for reader testing, which could be targeted by malicious instructions in the ingested data. - Sanitization: No specific filtering or sanitization procedures are defined for the content retrieved from external integrations.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill defines patterns for connecting to and reading from third-party services including Slack, Microsoft Teams, Google Drive, and SharePoint.
- The workflow explicitly mandates user confirmation before the agent searches or reads from these external systems, ensuring the user maintains control over data access.
- The integration targets are well-known, established productivity services.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill employs file system operations (
create_file,str_replace) to build and iterate on document scaffolds. - These operations are restricted to the local working directory or artifact space and are driven by the specific document sections agreed upon with the user.
Audit Metadata