ml-paper-writing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions define workflows for ingesting untrusted repository artifacts into the agent context, which presents an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Workflow 0) directs the agent to readREADME.mdfiles, source code, and experimental outputs from the user's research repository. - Boundary markers: The workflow lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within ingested project files.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses shell tools (
find,grep,pdflatex), python script execution, and network requests to academic APIs as documented acrossSKILL.mdandtemplates/README.md. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of repo-local content is described before interpolation into the prompt.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes local shell commands for project exploration and LaTeX compilation as part of its primary functionality.
- Evidence:
SKILL.md(Workflow 0) contains command patterns usingfind,grep, andxargsto explore codebases. - Evidence:
templates/README.mdprovides standard compilation commands includingpdflatex,bibtex, andlatexmk. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill automates and references downloads from well-known academic and technology services.
- Evidence:
templates/neurips2025/Makefileincludes anupgradetarget that downloads style files frommedia.neurips.cc. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdsuggests adding a search server frommcp.exa.aivianpxto facilitate real-time literature reviews.
Audit Metadata