cr-clone-trainer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted GitHub PR and issue comments to build the 'Clone' model. An attacker could potentially influence the generated agent's behavior by submitting specifically crafted comments in a repository being analyzed.\n
- Ingestion points:
scripts/collect-review-activity.pyfetches comments from GitHub repository endpoints.\n - Boundary markers: The skill instructions do not specify sanitization or boundary markers for the ingested external text.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to write local files, including new agent skill definitions (
SKILL.md) and behavioral models (MODEL.md,VOICE.md).\n - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of the comment bodies is performed before processing.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on local command execution to interact with the repository and GitHub.\n
- The
scripts/collect-review-activity.pyscript usessubprocess.runto execute the GitHub CLI (gh) for data collection.\n - The
workflow.mdinstructions guide the agent to usegitcommands (git log,git blame,git shortlog) to analyze repository ownership and history.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates a new AI agent skill and supporting configuration files at the end of the training process.\n - The training process results in the creation of a new
SKILL.md,MODEL.md, andVOICE.mdin the~/.agents/skills/cr-clone-<name>/directory.\n- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill establishes persistence by creating a new, independent agent skill directory on the host system.\n - This allows the generated 'Clone' agent to be invoked across different sessions independently of the trainer skill.
Audit Metadata