cr-clone-trainer

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted GitHub PR and issue comments to build the 'Clone' model. An attacker could potentially influence the generated agent's behavior by submitting specifically crafted comments in a repository being analyzed.\n
  • Ingestion points: scripts/collect-review-activity.py fetches comments from GitHub repository endpoints.\n
  • Boundary markers: The skill instructions do not specify sanitization or boundary markers for the ingested external text.\n
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to write local files, including new agent skill definitions (SKILL.md) and behavioral models (MODEL.md, VOICE.md).\n
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of the comment bodies is performed before processing.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on local command execution to interact with the repository and GitHub.\n
  • The scripts/collect-review-activity.py script uses subprocess.run to execute the GitHub CLI (gh) for data collection.\n
  • The workflow.md instructions guide the agent to use git commands (git log, git blame, git shortlog) to analyze repository ownership and history.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates a new AI agent skill and supporting configuration files at the end of the training process.\n
  • The training process results in the creation of a new SKILL.md, MODEL.md, and VOICE.md in the ~/.agents/skills/cr-clone-<name>/ directory.\n- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill establishes persistence by creating a new, independent agent skill directory on the host system.\n
  • This allows the generated 'Clone' agent to be invoked across different sessions independently of the trainer skill.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 14, 2026, 07:41 AM