melech-cr-clone-trainer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external GitHub comments to build a behavioral model, which is a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if an attacker submits malicious comments to influence the reviewer clone.
- Ingestion points: Interaction data including comments are fetched via the GitHub CLI and stored in
scratch/comments/for the trainer to process. - Boundary markers: The workflow does not explicitly mention the use of delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the human comments being analyzed.
- Capability inventory: The generated 'Clone' agent has the ability to post reviews and comments to GitHub using
gh pr reviewandgh api. - Sanitization: There is no specified logic for sanitizing or filtering instructions out of the comment text during the learning phase.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary function involves the dynamic generation of a new AI agent ('the Clone') by writing a new
SKILL.md,MODEL.md, andVOICE.mdto the user's local skill directory. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runto execute localgitandghcommands for repository analysis and data collection, as seen inscripts/collect-review-activity.pyand theworkflow.mdinstructions.
Audit Metadata